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1. Introduction 
 
The allocation of decision right between the board of directors and the professional 
management is one of the classic issues in the debate on corporate governance of 
cooperatives (Cornforth, 2004). Over the last decade, directors of agricultural cooperatives 
have increasingly questioned the appropriateness of their corporate governance structure. 
This debate has been fuelled by three developments. One is the more general trend among 
businesses to strengthen their accountability and transparency towards shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Responding to cases of fraud among stock-listed companies (such as 
Enron and WorldCom in the USA, and Parmalat and Ahold in Europe), regulatory agencies 
have developed new corporate governance rules and business associations have introduced 
stricter codes of conduct. This development has also encouraged  directors of cooperatives 
to start discussing  good corporate governance.  
 
The second development that triggered the debate on cooperative governance were the 
changes in the agrifood markets and the necessary responses from cooperatives (Bijman 
and Hendrikse, 2003). Over the last decades, the market for agrifood products has become 
more competitive due to reduced market protection in the countries of the EU as well as in 
transition countries. Cooperatives are no longer sheltered from competitive pressures and 
respond with new strategies for growth, diversification and innovation (Kyriakopoulos et 
al., 2004; Harte and O’Connell, 2007). Here the discussion has been focussed on whether 
traditional governance structures enable strategic reorientation, in particular whether 
traditional decision-making structures allow the cooperative to become more market 
oriented. As a cooperative is a user-oriented organisation (Barton, 1989), the question has 
been raised whether a shift in corporate governance structure is a prerequisite for the 
organisation be become truly customer-oriented (Beverland and Lindgreen, 2007). 
 
One of the main topics in this academic debate on the relationship between governance 
structure and strategy focussed on the difficulty for agricultural cooperatives to find 
additional equity capital needed for the new growth strategies. Due to the so-called vaguely 
defined property rights (Cook, 1995) and the resulting negative effect on member 
incentives to invest in the cooperative, cooperatives are assumed to encounter difficulties in 
attracting more equity capital from their members. As a solution, cooperatives have 
developed innovative ownership structures, including inviting non-members to invest in the 
cooperative or its subsidiaries (Nilsson, 1999; Chaddad and Cook, 2004). 
 
The third development that promoted a discussion among cooperative scholars and 
practitioners about good cooperative governance relates to the impact of growth strategies 
on the effectiveness of board control over the management. According to agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), one of the main functions of the board (as principal) is to 
make sure the management (as agent) takes decisions that are in the interest of the owners 
of the company. Insufficient monitoring and control provides room for decisions by 
managers that are not in the interest of the owners or, in the case of a cooperative, not in the 
interest of the members. Bijman (2005) has shown that the combination of high complexity 
in the cooperative firm with a heterogeneous membership leads to paralysis in the board 
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and thus to a de facto shift of decision-making power from the board to the managers. 
However, where agency theory starts from the premise of conflicting interests and seeks 
solutions in designing mechanisms that align interests, stewardship theory (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1989) emphasizes the shared interests between board and management in 
promoting organisational performance. Thus, from a practical point of view the discussion 
is not just about organizing effective control, but in obtaining a good balance between 
control on the one hand and empowerment of the managers on the other hand.  
 
Boards of cooperatives may respond to the need for strategic reorientation by delegating 
more decision rights to the managers, either within existing governance structures or within 
formally changed governance structures (Hendrikse, 2005; Kalogeras et al., 2007). These 
new structures entail a transfer of decision rights from the board to the professional 
management. Accommodating the world of farmers and the world of professional managers 
in one corporate governance structure is the challenging task of the board of directors. 
 
Our paper has been motivated both by practical and theoretical considerations. First, while 
several authors have discussed potential changes in cooperative governance structure, few 
studies provide empirical evidence. We present and discuss shifts in corporate governance 
in Dutch agricultural cooperatives. Second, by investigating the causes and effects of the 
changes in cooperative governance we seek to develop a typology of board structures. Such 
a typology could be used by cooperative directors that pursue, in the light of enhanced 
competitive pressure, a new balance between control and support. Third, as cooperatives 
are organisations with an economic objective, a change in governance structure is expected 
to eventually lead to improved performance. Our paper presents empirical results regarding 
the relationship between board model and the product portfolio and performance of 
agricultural cooperatives. 
 
A fourth motivation of our paper results from organizational change literature, which 
suggests that a change in formal structure may be needed in order to obtain a necessary 
change in organisational culture (Zenger et al., 2002; Lazzarini, 2004). This issue may be 
particularly relevant for cooperatives that are changing from a producer-oriented to a 
customer-oriented strategy. Cook (1994, p. 46) claims that the inherent features of 
cooperatives ‘lay the groundwork for a conservative, defensive, operation-oriented 
corporate culture, one that is almost anti-offensive.’ However, he does realize that some 
cooperatives have been able to overcome this limitation and ‘have been aggressively 
innovative and expansion oriented.’ One way to account for these differences in 
performance is to consider differences in structure. Strengthening of customer orientation 
has been claimed to be essential for the success of marketing cooperatives (Bijman, 2010). 
 
We contribute to the literature on cooperative governance in at least three ways. First, we 
provide empirical evidence of recent changes in corporate governance structures of 
agricultural cooperatives. Such an overview has not been published before. Second, we 
provide a typology of board models. This typology can be used to explore changes in 
cooperative governance in other parts of the world. Third, we contribute to the literature on 
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ownership structure of agricultural cooperatives. Where other authors have mainly focussed 
on changes in residual income rights, we focus on changes in decision rights. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the key characteristics of the 
governance of cooperatives and compare this with he governance of investor-owned firms. 
In section 3, we present the results of a qualitative study on new corporate governance 
models in Dutch agricultural cooperatives. In section 4, we formulate propositions 
regarding the relationship between board model
1
, product diversification, and performance. 
In section 5, we present the results of a quantitative investigation of cooperative corporate 
governance models, diversification, and performance of cooperatives. Section 6 concludes 
with several observations and discussion. 
 
2. Corporate governance in cooperatives 
 
The formal governance of a cooperative reflects its main purpose, i.e. serving member 
interests. Traditionally, the board of directors of the cooperative, democratically chosen by 
and from the membership, has been the main body governing the activities and investments 
of the cooperative firm. In small cooperatives the board of directors also carries out the 
operational management. However, as the cooperative grows in scale and scope, 
professionals are hired to manage the cooperative 
2
. As a result, cooperatives apply the 
classical division of labour (Fama and Jensen, 1983) between decision control (i.e., 
ratification and monitoring) and decision management (such as initiation and 
implementation). The board of directors takes care of decision control, while decision 
management is the responsibility of the professional managers. 
 
Unlike in the classical stock-listed firm, where the board represents owners which are 
mainly investors, the board of an agricultural cooperative consists of and represents farmers 
who are entrepreneurs themselves. The members have their own farming business and 
evaluate the strategies of the cooperative from the perspective of their individual farming 
interests. The managers are entrepreneurs who seek the development of the cooperative 
firm, follow personal career ambitions that include non-cooperative positions, have their 
own peer group, and compare the performance of ‘their’ firm with non-cooperative 
competitors. It is a key task of the board of directors to accommodate these two worlds. 
 
We define a governance structure as an organizational design that incorporates systems of 
decision making, operational control, and incentives (Yin and Zajac, 2004). In other words, 
the governance structure of an organization defines who is in control, whose interests are 
represented, and who receives benefits from the organization. A standard way of defining a 
governance structure is to distinguish decision rights and income rights (Hansmann, 1996). 
Decision rights specify who may take decisions on the strategies and policies of the 
organization, as well as on the use of assets and thereby on the employment of people 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘board model’ and ‘corporate governance model’ are used as synonyms. 
2 This process of replacing board management by professional management as the cooperative grows does not 
take place in countries where the board has the statutory obligation to manage the cooperative. 
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working with these assets. Decision rights include the allocation of authority (delegation, 
centralization), decision control (ratification, monitoring), decision management (initiation, 
implementation), task design, conflict resolution, and choosing enforcement mechanisms. 
Income rights are rights to the (monetary) benefits and costs resulting from the activities of 
the organisation. Income rights are reflected in the composition of cost and payment 
schemes, thereby creating the incentive system. Examples of income rights in cooperatives 
are direct and indirect benefits of patronage, cost and benefit allocation schemes like 
pooling arrangements, and the compensation package of the members of the management 
team. 
 
The corporate governance structure of cooperatives is often compared to that of investor-
owned firms (IOFs) (Hendrikse, 2007). The classical perspective evaluating different 
corporate governance structures is that of principal-agent theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Tirole, 2001). Because of a separation of ownership and control, an agency relationship 
exists between the principal (investor, owner, outsider) and the agent (manager, 
entrepreneur, insider). The agency relationship is characterized by asymmetric information 
and potential conflicting interests, which may then lead to the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The corporate governance structure should reduce these problems.  
 
Although the agency situation in cooperatives seems similar to the one in IOFs, with the 
board of directors as principal and the professional manager as agent, there are some 
fundamental differences. First, members have a double set of income rights in the 
cooperative: as users they benefit from patronizing the cooperative, as owners they provide 
equity capital and receive a return on investment. Traditionally, the latter has been 
subordinated to the former, but with the need of some cooperatives to obtain additional 
equity capital for strengthening its market orientation, the financial relationship between 
member and cooperative has been reinforced (Chaddad and Cook 2004). 
 
Second, members formally participate in the decision-making process of the cooperative. 
As the board of directors consists of members and is elected by the General Assembly of 
members, the latter have more influence on company strategy than investors in an IOF 
(Hendrikse, 1998).  
 
Third, where owners of an IOF usually have uniform interests, namely to obtain high return 
on investment, members of a cooperative may be heterogeneous in their interests. 
Heterogeneity among (board) members may have serious impact on the efficacy of the 
cooperative, as it leads to mistrust and deadlocks in decision-making (Hansmann, 1996). 
 
Fourth, cooperatives lack external mechanisms for disciplining the management (Staatz, 
1987; Trechter et al., 1997). Unlike stock-listed companies that are scrutinized by the 
financial media (on behalf of current and potential shareholders), there is no external 
financial assessment of the performance of the cooperative (and therefore of its 
management). This implies that the task of performance evaluation mainly lies with the 
members and their representatives in the board of directors. 
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Agency theory captures prominently the advantages of delegating decision-making by 
having a principal assigning a task, or multiple tasks, to an agent. However, this delegation 
is not without problems. The key issue is asymmetric information between principal and 
agent, in our case between board of directors and professional management. While the 
board may have formal authority, the real authority lies with the management due to its 
superior knowledge of both the firm and the competitive environment. When the board 
does not hold real authority, delegating formal authority may bring economic benefits. 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) suggest that “the delegation of formal authority to a subordinate 
will both facilitate the agent’s participation in the organization and foster his incentives to 
acquire relevant information about the corresponding activities”. However, delegation 
involves a costly loss of control for the principal. As a result of this trade-off, formal 
authority will not be delegated for all decisions. Aghion and Tirole (1997) found that 
formal authority is more likely to be delegated for decisions that are sufficiently innovative 
that the principal has not accumulated substantial prior expertise or competencies. 
 
3. Corporate governance models in Dutch agricultural cooperatives 
The Netherlands has about 215 agricultural cooperatives, most of them very small or 
dormant. Some 40 are member of the Netherlands Cooperative Council for Agri- and 
Horticulture (NCR), representing more than 90% of the 140,000 farmer-members and the € 
32 billion turnover of the 215 cooperatives. Of these 40 cooperatives, we were able to 
collect data for the top 33 (in size). In our sample the differences in size and membership is 
substantial. In 2006, the largest cooperative had a turnover 4.6 billion euro, while the 
smallest had a turnover of only 34 million euro (Table 1); membership ranges from 60 to 
27,470. 
 
Data on the corporate governance models of Dutch agricultural cooperatives have been 
collected by several means following to a stepwise approach. In step 1, general information 
on changes in cooperative corporate governance has been collected through literature study. 
In step 2, the findings from literature have been discussed in personal interviews with six 
Dutch experts on cooperatives.
3
 Together step 1 and 2 resulted in an overview of the main 
shifts in corporate governance among Dutch agricultural cooperatives and in the 
development of a typology of board models. In step 3, semi-structured interviews have 
been held with the chairman of the board of directors of eight different cooperatives as well 
as with managers of six different Dutch agricultural cooperatives. The objective of these 
interviews was to obtain personal experiences with particular (changes in) forms of 
cooperative corporate governance. All interviews were held in 2006. In step 4, company 
documents and websites have been studied to find out what corporate governance model 
the 33 largest agricultural cooperatives in The Netherlands applied in 2006 (Table 1). 
Finally, in step 5, the results of this 2006 survey were used for a more quantitative analysis 
of the performance effects (see section 6 for more details on this step). 
                                                 
3 Two law professors with special expertise on cooperative legislation; one economics professor specialized in 
financing cooperatives; one consultant who often advices cooperatives in restructuring processes, and one 
former chairman of a large feed cooperative; and one researcher on international comparisons among 
cooperatives. 
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Table 1. Board models of the 33 largest agricultural cooperatives in The Netherlands (2006) 
  Name Main product  
Turnover 
2006, 
Euro 
Traditional 
model 
Manage-
ment model 
Corpora-
tion model 
1 Friesland Foods                                   dairy 4675 0 0 1 
2 Campina                                           dairy 3624 0 0 1 
3 FloraHolland flowers 2136 1 0 0 
4 Aalsmeer                                  flowers 1756 1 0 0 
5 Cosun                                     sugar 1469 1 0 0 
6 The Greenery                                      vegetables 1448 0 0 1 
7 Cehave Landbouwbelang                                  feed 664 0 1 0 
8 AVEBE                                              potato starch 634 0 1 0 
9 Agrifirm                                            feed 576 0 0 1 
10 Cebeco Group                           poultry 556 1 0 0 
11 DOC Kaas dairy 358 0 1 0 
12 CNB flower bulbs 327 1 0 0 
13 FresQ vegetables 317 1 0 0 
14 FromFarmers                         feed 313 0 1 0 
15 Fruitmasters                     fruit 265 1 0 0 
16 ZON                         vegetables 237 0 0 1 
17 CZAV                            inputs for arable farming 214 0 1 0 
18 Agrico             seed potatoes 200 0 1 0 
19 CNC mushrooms 186 0 1 0 
20 VDT vegetables 155 1 0 0 
21 Rijnvallei                            feed 150 0 0 1 
22 Horticoop inputs for horticulture 144 1 0 0 
23 CONO dairy 133 1 0 0 
24 CR Delta                 cattle breeding 125 0 0 1 
25 Boerenbond Deurne inputs 116 1 0 0 
26 BGB vegetables 99 1 0 0 
27 Pigture Group                                          pig breeding 85 0 0 1 
28 Rouveen dairy 65 1 0 0 
29 Nedato potato 63 0 0 1 
30 Boerenbond Ysselsteyn feed / inputs 59 1 0 0 
31 VON flowers 57 0 0 1 
32 Arkervaart-Twente feed 44 1 0 0 
33 AB Limburg employment 34 0 1 0 
 Total   15 8 10 
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In this section we present our typology of board models. We start with a description of the 
traditional board model. We then follow with a discussion of the main changes in 
cooperative governance we have found among Dutch agricultural cooperatives over the last 
two decades. Finally, we present the two non-traditional board models that can be found in 
Dutch practice. 
 
The traditional model 
 
The traditional corporate governance model among Dutch agricultural cooperatives has 
existed for more than a century, ever since enactment of the first law on cooperatives in 
1876. Under Dutch cooperative law a cooperative is both an association and a firm. More 
specifically, in Dutch law, a cooperative is defined as a firm that performs economic 
functions to the benefit of the members and that has the legal status of an association (Galle, 
2010). All requirements as to the governance of associations also apply to cooperatives. All 
associations have two governing bodies: a General Assembly and a Board of Directors. A 
third governing body, the Supervisory Committee, is not compulsory for associations, but 
common among cooperatives and it is even legally required for large cooperatives.
4
 
Although traditionally the executive function was carried out by the Directors themselves 
(and still is in small cooperatives), most cooperatives in the Netherlands nowadays have 
one or more professional managers who are actually managing the daily operations of the 
cooperative. Thus, most cooperatives have a fourth governing body, the professional board 
of management. Let us briefly describe the tasks and responsibilities of these four 
governing bodies as they prevail in Dutch agricultural cooperatives. 
 
The General Assembly (GA) consists of all members of the cooperative. Within the GA 
each member has at least one vote, but most cooperatives apply some kind of proportional 
voting rights (Van der Sangen, 2010). Voting in the GA is used to make decisions on the 
appointment of the members of the Board of Directors, selection of the members of the 
Supervisory Committee, as well as on major issues like terminating the cooperative, 
mergers of the cooperative, changing of the by-laws. The GA also has the right to 
(dis)approve the annual financial report. The control function of the GA is mainly done ex-
post. 
 
The Board of Directors (BoD) is the main decision-making body; it initiates, develops and 
decides upon the strategies and policies of the cooperative. The BoD, as the fiduciary agent 
of the members, has the formal authority and legal responsibility to act in the best interests 
of the members. According to Dutch association law, the BoD can consist of one person, 
but it is more common to have several directors. Traditionally, the BoD consists of 
members of the cooperative, but it is allowed, under association law, that the BoD partially 
or fully consists of persons that are not members of the cooperative. The members of the 
BoD are elected and appointed by the GA, and the BoD has to report back to the GA. The 
                                                 
4 All around the world, cooperative governance structures consist of a General Assembly and a Board of 
Directors, while most cooperatives also have some kind of Supervisory Committee (Henrij, 2005). 
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BoD appoints the professional managers of the cooperative. An important function of the 
BoD is control of the management. Even in the situation where the cooperative has a 
professional management board, the BoD continues to be, according to the law, the main 
governing body. Decisions of the BoD are taken collectively, and responsibilities and 
liabilities are borne collectively. 
 
The Supervisory Committee (SC) is responsible for controlling the activities and decisions 
of the BoD. This control function is performed ex-ante. As there is no legal obligation for 
associations and small cooperatives to have a SC, the exact tasks and responsibilities of the 
SC are determined in the by-laws of the individual cooperatives. The SC is appointed by 
the GA. Traditionally, the SC consists of members of the cooperative. Since 1989, when 
changes in corporation law were introduced, cooperatives that have more than 16 million 
Euro equity capital, that have a compulsory employee council, and that have more than 100 
employees are legally required, just like IOFs that have these size characteristics, to have a 
Board of Commissioners (BoC) as supervisory body (Galle, 2010). The legal responsibility 
of the BoC is to look after the interests of the company as a whole, not just the interests of 
one group of stakeholders (such as the members). Specific BoD decisions require ex ante 
approval by the BoC, and the employee council has the right to (dis)approve new members 
of the BoC. 
 
Traditionally the role of the professional managers has been just to carry out what the BoD 
had decided. However, as cooperatives have grown in size and complexity, the 
management has taken over some of the decision-making functions of the BoD. Using the 
terminology of Fama and Jensen (1983), large cooperatives now have a separation of 
decision management and decision control. Thus, while the BoD continues to be 
responsible for decision control (i.e., ratification and monitoring), the professional 
management has acquired the responsibility for decision management (i.e., initiation and 
implementation). The professional managers (such as CEO and CFO) are appointed by the 
BoD, often after consultation with the SC. 
 
The combination of these traditional elements of composition and function of the governing 
bodies of the cooperative leads to our first model of cooperative corporate governance, the 
traditional model (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: The Traditional Model of Cooperative Corporate Governance  
 
 
 
Changes in cooperative governance 
 
Over the last 20 years, there have been significant changes in the corporate governance of 
agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands. These changes have been described mainly by 
legal scholars (Galle, 1993; Galle and Van der Sangen, 1999; Van der Sangen, 2001; Galle, 
2010).  Most of these changes affect the role of the BoD, particularly the relationship 
between the BoD and the management. Also the role of the SC has been altered. The 
following organizational changes have been identified. First, all of the large cooperatives 
now have introduced a legal separation between the cooperative association and the 
cooperative firm. Assets are placed in the cooperative firm, which has obtained the legal 
form of BV (similar to Ltd. in the UK) or NV (similar to Plc. in the UK). This change 
implies that the dual structure of the cooperative – being both an association and the firm – 
has been formalized by the legal separation. Important reasons for cooperatives to introduce 
this legal separation are the reduction of the liabilities for the cooperative and the granting 
of more autonomy to the professional managers (Van der Sangen, 2001). 
 
The second change relates to the composition of the BoD. Should the BoD consist of only 
members of the cooperative, or can outside experts join the BoD? Outside experts may 
bring along special knowledge, for instance about finance or marketing, which the farmers 
in the board may not have. Moreover, outside experts may themselves have experience in 
leading a large company, thus bringing additional management expertise into the BoD. An 
issue often discussed within cooperatives is whether the manager(s) should be part of the 
BoD (which is allowed under Dutch association law). If the answer is yes, the board would 
resemble the one-tier board model of corporate firms that can be found in many countries 
but is not common in the Netherlands. The most extreme option is that the BoD consists of 
only professional managers, which implies there are no longer farmer-members 
Board of Directors 
Supervisory  
Committee 
Management 
General Assembly 
 Appointment and Control 
 Election and Appointment 
 Control 
 Appointment 
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participating in the BoD. In our sample, 12 out of 33 had outside experts in their BoD; 8 of 
these 12 have a BoD consisting of only professional managers (no members of the 
cooperative).  
 
The third change relates to the main function of the BoD. While traditionally the BoD is the 
main decision-making body of the cooperative, with the management mainly for executing 
the decisions taken by the BoD, nowadays most of the expertise and thus the real authority 
lies with the professional management. The function of the BoD may shift towards a more 
supervisory role. 
 
Changes in the role and structure of the BoD often also lead to changes in the function and 
composition of the Supervisory Committee (Dortmond, 1999). Thus, the fourth change in 
corporate governance structure of the cooperative deals with the main function of the SC. 
When cooperatives have reached a particular size (see above), the SC becomes a Board of 
Commissioners (BoC), with the legal task of controlling the management of the cooperative 
firm. However, in these large cooperatives the BoD itself has shifted towards a supervisory 
role. The result is a situation of double control of the management, both by the BoD and by 
the BoC. Several cooperatives have solved this issue of double supervision by making the 
BoD and the BoC consisting of the same persons (a so-called personal union). In these 
cases, the members of the BoD of the cooperative association are also the members of the 
BoC of the cooperative firm. 
 
The fifth change relates to the composition of the BoC/SC. Similar to the changes in 
composition of the BoD, a cooperative can also decide to have both members and outside 
experts in the SC. Van Dijk (2006) found that 26 of the 40 largest cooperatives had outside 
experts in the BoC/SC. Most of these experts (28%) had themselves experience as manager 
of a large company; 18% had experience as financial manager. Other fields of expertise 
were HRM, marketing, retail, academia and politics. Incorporation of external experts in 
the BoD and the BoC/SC has been considered as a trend towards more professionalism in 
the governance of the cooperative. 
 
The sixth change relates to the implementation of a Member Council (MC). Such council 
has taken over most of the legal obligations of the GA. The MC consists of members of the 
cooperative and is appointed by the GA. In large cooperatives, members are usually 
organized in geographical districts. The chairman of the district board, who is elected by all 
members of the district, becomes a member of the member council. Reasons for 
establishing an MC are the need felt by the BoD to bridge the gap between BoD and the 
membership and to have a group of committed members from which future board members 
can be selected. Although this may not imply a change in the relationship between board 
and management – the key issue of corporate governance – it may affect the influence and 
thereby the commitment of individual members. 
 
All of these changes among Dutch agricultural cooperatives have led to the rise of two new 
cooperative governance models (or board models): the management model and the 
corporation model. Of the 33 cooperatives, 15 still adhere to the traditional model, 8 apply 
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the management model, and 10 have chosen to apply the corporation model. We will now 
describe the features of these new models, particularly those characteristics that distinguish 
them from the traditional model. 
 
The management model 
 
Figure 2 presents the management model of cooperative corporate governance. The main 
characteristic of this model is that the management board (consisting of professional 
managers) is also the BoD of the cooperative. This model implies that the BoD no longer 
consists of members of the cooperative. In the professional literature as well as in the 
interviews with directors and managers at least three advantages of this model have been 
frequently mentioned: there is no longer a problem of double supervision (by both the BoD 
and the SC) over the management; the BoD has become professional and is fully devoted to 
directing the firm; and the management board has obtained more autonomy, which provides 
an opportunity for strengthening managerial entrepreneurship in the cooperative firm. The 
disadvantages mentioned were the lack of a structure for ex ante evaluation of management 
decisions on member interests; the lack of a clear distinction between the responsibilities of 
the BoD and the management; and a lack of member influence on the decisions of 
directors/managers.
5
 
 
Figure 2: The Management Model of Cooperative Corporate Governance 
 
  
                                                 
5 In the management model, the SC/BoC has less authority than the BoD has in the traditional model. 
General Assembly /  
Member Council 
 
Supervisory 
Committee / BoC 
Board of Directors  
 = 
Management 
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The corporation model 
 
Figure 3 presents the corporation model of cooperative corporate governance. This model 
can only be applied by cooperatives that have a legal separation between the cooperative 
association and the cooperative firm, where the association is the full owner of the firm. 
The main characteristic of the corporation model is that the directors of the association are 
also members of the SC/BoC of the firm (i.e., there is a personal union between these to 
governing bodies). Often, the BoD consists of only members of the cooperative, while the 
SC/BoC also consists of a number of outside experts. This model implies that there is not a 
separate supervisory committee at the level of the association.  
 
The following advantages of this model were mentioned in the interviews with board 
members and managers: no double supervision of the management; more autonomy for the 
management; one body that attends to the interests of members and firm; and a SC that 
directly controls the management of the firm. One disadvantage mentioned is that, while 
the personal union between BoD and BoC combines several responsibilities and therefore 
has to find a compromise between various interests, in practice the members of these 
boards may clearly favour one interest above the other (e.g., they may favour firm interests 
over member interests). Another disadvantage is the absence of a supervisory committee at 
the association level. This problem can be partly solved by establishing a member council, 
which then can perform the function of controlling the BoD/BoC. 
 
Figure 3: The Corporation Model of Cooperative Corporate Governance 
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4. Propositions on the impact of corporate governance model 
 
Having identified the different cooperative governance models, we are interested in 
studying the impact of these different models on the product diversification and the 
performance of the cooperative. For this task, we have formulated three propositions. 
 
The first proposition presents a benchmark. Corporate governance structure may not matter 
at all. For example, LeVay (1985, p. 5) states “(…) whatever the formal basis of association, 
co-operatives may behave no differently from other types of enterprise.” A motivation is 
provided by the relational contracting line of reasoning (Baker et al., 1999; Hendrikse 
2007). If the involved parties agree on a certain course of action in an informal, self-
enforcing way, then the formal aspect of the relationship does not affect the distribution of 
bargaining power. The incentive to invest in particular projects is assumed to be identical 
under every governance structure. This argument results in proposition 0: 
 
P0: Board model has no effect on product portfolio or performance. 
 
The next two propositions specify the impact of the corporate governance model on product 
portfolio and performance. We have identified three theoretical perspectives that relate to 
the above description of board models. We distinguish a legal perspective, an agency / 
managerial power perspective, and an agenda setting perspective. 
 
Cooperatives embody various objectives due to member heterogeneity (Hansmann, 1996; 
Hart and Moore, 1996). For example, older members who have invested in their 
cooperative during many years of membership measure good performance by the amount of 
patronage refunds not retained, while young members may be interested in having the 
cooperative firm build strong market positions.
6
 The idea is that diversification in the 
cooperative firm can create conflicts of interest between different classes of members 
because some members benefit from diversification and others do not (or are even harmed 
by it). An appropriate legal structure can reduce the losses from diversification that some 
members would otherwise bear, and therefore facilitate diversification in new directions. 
Another aspect of the legal separation between the association of members and the 
cooperative firm is that it provides a commitment of the members not to interfere too much 
with the daily decisions of the management. Finally, it may also facilitate the distribution of 
rents over the various classes of members. 
 
When companies become large and diversified, good top-managers may be difficult to find. 
Those that have the capabilities to run a complex company can negotiate low interference 
from the board of directors (Adams et al., 2010). Giving managers more autonomy is in 
line with standard economic organization theory’s prediction that decision-rights should be 
allocated to those actors that have the knowledge to make those decisions (e.g., Aghion and 
                                                 
6 In Dutch cooperative there is no periodic return of equity. Traditionally all equity was jointly owned. Over 
the last decades, most cooperatives have started to individualize a small part of the equity capital. This 
individual part is returned upon termination of membership. 
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Tirole, 1997). Having such autonomy is an important element of the intrinsic rewards that 
top-managers prefer as incentive for their effort. Thus, we may expect that when 
cooperatives become larger, more international, and more diversified, the main function of 
the board will shift from directing to supervising. For the corporation model of cooperative 
corporate governance this means that real authority resides with the managers, while formal 
authority stays with the members (Baker et al., 1999). In other words, members have 
delegated decision rights to the managers. 
 
Managers have different objective functions, but it is expected that there will be increased 
attention and sensitivity to final product markets due to the concern of managers for their 
reputation in the market for managers (Bebchuk and Friend, 2003). Managers may even 
prefer to diversify into activities for personal motives, such as a reduction of employment 
risk, that reduce the value of the firm (Montgomery, 1982). Notice that the diversification 
choices of managers are most likely to be different from those of members. Members have, 
as owners of the cooperative, a stake in the future profitability of the cooperative, but they 
are also interested in obtaining a better price for the products they deliver to the cooperative 
firm. If they have to choose between an investment in expanding an existing plant, thereby 
increasing economies of scale, and an investment in a new venture, they most likely favour 
the first option.  
 
One way to distinguish the three board models is with respect to the identity of the party 
having autonomy over the strategies and policies of the cooperative firm. More decision-
making rights are transferred from the BoD to the management when moving from the 
traditional model, to the corporation model, and to the management model. We expect that 
a shift in decision rights has implications for diversification because the party determining 
the agenda of decisions determines to a large extent the outcome of the decision process 
(McKelvey, 1976). The above arguments lead to proposition 1: 
 
P1a: Cooperatives with a traditional board model are least diversified in their product 
portfolio. 
P1b: Cooperatives with a management board model are most diversified in their product 
portfolio. 
 
Our final proposition concerns the influence of the board on the financial performance of 
the firm. Enterprises perform well financially when they are internally coherent, i.e. various 
organizational attributes of the enterprise are aligned (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994). One 
of these attributes is the board model. Recall that an investor-owned firm is designed to 
bring the enterprise to maximum profits, whereas a cooperative is committed to the 
interests of the members as users of the cooperative firm’s services. Applying this logic to 
the three board models, it is expected that the traditional board model has the best financial 
performance due to its strong focus on members. The corporation model is expected to 
have the worst financial performance because it tries to serve both member (as supplier) 
interests and customer interests. Because the organizational structure required for the two 
tasks is different, it is expected that a firm pursuing both supplier and customer interests 
will experience tensions. We summarize this argument in proposition 2: 
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P2a: Cooperatives with a traditional board model have the best financial performance. 
P2b: Cooperatives with a corporation board model have the worst financial performance. 
 
5. Empirical illustration 
 
In this section, we provide a practical illustration of our propositions. We first describe the 
companies that we investigated and the information source that we used. Next, we explain 
the information that we gathered on each company. Finally, we show the main findings of 
our investigation. 
 
Companies and data collection 
In section 3, we explained how we identified the governance models of the largest 
agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands. We were able to obtain most of the required 
information for 33 cooperatives: 15 had a traditional model, 8 had a management model, 
and the remaining 10 had a corporation model). As information source, we used REACH, 
which is an electronic database with financial information on over 1.7 million Dutch 
companies.
7
 All information refers to 2006. 
 
Information on the companies 
We used two types of information, one involving product diversification and the other 
financial performance. 
 
To approach product diversification, we applied unweighted product-count measures. 
Unweighted product-count measures are reliable and easy to compute and they have low 
information requirements (Lubatkin, 1993; Montgomery, 1982). Weighted measures are 
more refined, but the breakdown of sales that is necessary to calculate the weights was not 
available for most of the cooperatives in our sample. Besides, Lubatkin et al. (1993) find a 
strong correspondence between product-count measures and Rumelt’s (1974) categorical 
measures, which supports the validity of product-count measures. 
 
To be more precise, we applied a variant of the entropy measure of diversification, with the 
sales weights set at one for each activity. One advantage of the entropy measure is that 
firms that are not diversified receive the score zero, which facilitates the interpretation. 
Another, more important advantage is that the entropy measure can be broken down into an 
unrelated and a related component (Palepu, 1985). Accordingly, we made a distinction 
between total diversification, unrelated diversification, and related diversification. Total 
diversification refers to the number of different four-digit industry codes of a company. 
Unrelated diversification is associated with the number of different two-digit industry codes 
of a company. Related diversification involves four-digit industry codes with identical first 
two digits, but different final two digits (see, e.g., Palepu, 1985).  
 
                                                 
7 REACH is published by Bureau Van Dijk (see: http://www.bvdinfo.com) 
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For financial performance, we adopted accounting-based measures.  Market-based 
measures, like the market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s q, are not available for cooperatives. 
Also, accounting-based measures have a close connection to the decision variables 
controlled by managers. Our measures can be divided into two categories: return and 
growth. In the first category, we included return on total assets and return on equity. Return 
on equity may be a more relevant performance measure for the owners of cooperatives than 
return on total assets, but it is also influenced to a larger extent by the capital structure of 
the company than return on total assets (Hill et al., 1992). The second category contains 
asset growth and sales growth. Although not directly related to financial performance, we 
also added growth of the number of employees.  
 
Findings 
 
Table 2 shows the mean values for each board model. The number of observations varies 
for the traditional model and for the corporation model, since not all information was 
available for each cooperative in these cases.  
 
Table 2: Means of the Board Models 
  N 
Traditional 
Model N 
Management 
Model N 
Corporation 
Model 
Total 
Diversification 15 0.60 8 1.12 10 0.90 
Unrelated 
Diversification 15 0.40 8 0.50 10 0.50 
Related 
Diversification 15 0.20 8 0.62 9 0.40 
Return on Total 
Assets 9 23.98 8 4.47 9 4.43 
Return on Equity 9 47.42 8 8.32 10 11.63 
Asset Growth 15 2.00 8 -1.75 10 2.61 
Sales Growth 12 -0.78 8 2.28 9 9.06 
Employee Growth 11 -6.75 8 -6.88 9 -2.35 
N varies for the traditional and the management model because not all information was 
available for these cases. 
In line with propositions 1a and 1b, on average, cooperatives with a traditional board model 
seem least diversified, whereas cooperatives with a management board model seem most 
diversified. These findings are most prominent for total diversification and related 
diversification. For unrelated diversification, the differences are smaller (between the 
traditional and the other two models) or even absent (between the management and the 
corporation model). Figure 4 illustrates these results. 
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Figure 4: Diversification Averages of the Board Models 
 
Regarding financial returns, cooperatives with a traditional model clearly outperform all 
other types of companies. Compared with cooperatives that have a management model, 
cooperatives with a corporation model only have a marginally lower average return on total 
assets and a fairly higher return on equity. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The averages are 
in line with proposition 2a, which predicted superior financial performance for the 
traditional board model, but are in contrast with proposition 2b, which predicted the lowest 
financial performance for the corporation board model,  
 
  
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
Traditional
Model
Management
Model
Corporation
Model
Total Diversification
Unrelated Diversification
Related Diversification
20 
 
Figure 5: Return Averages of the Board Models 
 
Proposition 2b is also not empirically illustrated by the average growth measures. In 
contrast with the proposition, cooperatives with a corporation model have the highest asset, 
sales, and employee growth. Furthermore, in contradiction with proposition 2a, sales 
growth of the cooperatives with a traditional model is actually the lowest of all models, 
although asset and employee growth are somewhat higher than those for cooperatives with 
a management model. Figure 6 graphically illustrates these findings. 
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Figure 6: Growth Averages of the Board Models 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Cooperatives are hybrid organizational structures in many ways. Recent economic 
organisation literature on cooperatives has focused on changes in ownership structure and 
thereby in income rights. This article looked explicitly at changes in the allocation of 
decision rights, particularly between the different governing bodies of the cooperative. We 
asked three questions: (1) what are the changes in cooperative governance? (2) can we 
develop a typology of corporate governance models? and (3) what impact do changes in 
corporate governance structure have on the performance and diversification of the 
cooperative. 
 
We found that over the last 20 years in agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands a 
division of labour has appeared between the Board of Directors taking responsibility for 
decision control (ratification and monitoring) and the professional management being 
responsible for decision management (initiation and implementation). This division of 
labour has been institutionalized in new board models. Besides the traditional model, which 
has been around for more than 100 years, we have found two new corporate governance 
models: the management model and the corporation model. In the management model, the 
management of the cooperative firm also forms the Board of Directors (BoD) of the 
cooperative association. In this model there is no longer a distinction between decision-
making on and executing of the strategies and policies of the cooperative. The BoD has 
been professionalized, and the supervisory committee supervises association and firm at the 
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same time. In the corporation model the BoD of the cooperative association has become the 
supervisory committee of the cooperative firm. A legal separation between association and 
firm has been established, turning the cooperative association into a 100% shareholder of 
the cooperative firm. This structure provides the management with relatively most 
autonomy. 
 
Cooperatives have shifted to another corporate governance model because of changes in the 
competitive environment. In order to develop appropriate strategic and tactic responses to 
competitive pressures, cooperatives felt the need to strengthen the autonomy of the 
management, to reduce member influence on operational decisions, to find new sources of 
equity capital, to professionalize the supervisory bodies. In other words, strategic re-
orientation towards more customer focus, diversification and innovation, has been 
accompanied by changes in the decision-making structure.  
 
While we have assumed that cooperatives have adjusted their governance structure to be 
better equipped for changes in the competitive environment, the debate on the causality 
between structure and strategy is not fully settled (Galan and Sanchez-Bueno, 2009). 
Another issue that we have not touched upon in this paper is the power relationship 
between board of directors and management. In the literature on corporate governance in 
non-cooperative firms, some authors claim that boards are endogenously determined 
institutions (Adams et al., 2010). Although board of directors in cooperative are still 
different than boards in non-cooperative firms, the shift in cooperative corporate 
governance towards more IOF-like models would justify further research into this direction. 
 
The illustration of the propositions with data from the largest Dutch agricultural 
cooperatives suggest that we need to reject proposition 0. In other words, there seems to be 
an association between board model on the one hand and product portfolio and financial 
performance on the other hand. Our empirical results support the propositions 1a and 1b. 
Cooperatives with traditional board models are least diversified in their product portfolio, 
while cooperatives with a management model are most diversified. The assumed 
relationship between financial performance and board model is only partially supported in 
our analysis. Traditional models do not necessarily perform better and corporation models 
do not overall perform worse than other models. 
 
Although we include almost the total population of the large agricultural cooperatives in the 
Netherlands, the amount of observations is actually too small for meaningful statistical 
analysis. Thus, we cannot generalized our findings to agricultural cooperatives outside of 
the Netherlands. Still we think we have provided useful insights in the development of 
corporate governance models and their implications. Future research, preferably with a 
larger sample, should provide definite answers and the assumed associations. 
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